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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ment points out, that Article 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code of
1951 destroys the alleged incentive to take life, and even assuming
that the incentive continues to exist, it would certainly be no
stronger where the transaction is with a legal reserve company
rather than with a fraternal benefit society.
While the court recognizes the rule of Cheeves v. Anders as con-
trolling, this recent decision clearly and strongly shows dissatisfac-
tion with the doubtful doctrine and indicates that, with the aid of
legislation, an opportunity to change it would be welcome. It is
believed that it is time to get into step with the 'rest of the states
on this important point.
R. A. C., Jr.
M.J.H.
PRICE MAINTENANCE AS AFFECTED BY THE
SCHWEGMANN DECISION
A FTER working since the early 190 0 's to obtain federal ap-
proval of resale price maintenance, the proponents of price
maintenance seemingly hit paydirt in 1937 when Congress passed
the Miller-Tydings Amendment' to the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act declared illegal every
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or
foreign commerce. The common law recognized that competition
cannot be unreasonably restrained, but in order to strike down un-
reasonable restraints someone had to become dissatisfied and file
a suit. Under the Sherman Act the Attorney General could institute
the action and protect the public from unreasonable restraints on
trade. The United States Supreme Court applied the "rule of rea-
l Act of Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, Title VIII, 50 STAT. 673, 693; 15 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1.
2 Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 1, 26 STAT. 209; 15 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1.
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son" to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. A restraint is valid if it is
necessary to the reasonable protection of a property right which
the law recognizes.8 Under the statute the Supreme Court struck
down resale price maintenance contracts concerning goods in inter-
state commerce as void. Applying the "rule of reason," the Court
said the contracts were not reasonable as to the public nor limited
to what was reasonably necessary for the protection of the cove-
nantee.4
The 1933 depression, with its wave of price cutting, caused
great pressure to be applied on state legislatures by manufacturers
who had created a direct demand and goodwill for their products
by extensive advertising and particularly by independent retailers
who were threatened by the price-cutting practices of the chain
and department stores.5 Their complaints led to adoption of Fair
Trade Acts by a majority of the states, under which retailers could
be bound by a contract with a manufacturer to sell trade-marked
or brand products at prices fixed by the manufacturer. Most states
also included a nonsigner clause which similarly restricted re-
tailers to sell at the manufacturer's price if they had knowledge
that the article was a Fair Trade item.
At the time the Miller-Tydings Amendment became law, 42
states had passed Fair Trade Acts.' In 1936 the Supreme Court
upheld nonsigner provisions in state Fair Trade Acts.! The system
of price-fixing which these Acts embraced, however, did not hold
up against competition of goods moving in interstate commerce,
which were not subject to the price restrictions. Federal legislation
was necessary to prevent sellers from avoiding the state Fair Trade
Acts by obtaining and selling goods which had moved in inter-
state commerce.
3 United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S. 106 (1911) ; Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911) ; United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
4Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
5 See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Hiarv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
6 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corporation, 341 U. S. 384, 398 (1951).
7 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
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The Miller-Tydings Amendment excepted from the operation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act "contracts or agreements" establish-
ing minimum prices for the resale of trade-marked goods, in free
and open competition with other goods of the same general class,
which had moved in interstate commerce, if such contracts or
agreements were valid under the law of the state where the goods
were to be resold.
The resale price maintenance structure was very strong early
in 1951. Forty-four states then had Fair Trade Acts. Only Florida,
Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia did not
have such legislation Nonsigner provisions of state laws were
not expressly mentioned in the Miller-Tydings Amendment, and
the possibility had been considered that the Supreme Court of the
United States might construe the Amendment not to validate the
nonsigner provisions.' But decisions of lower courts had construed
the Amendment to validate the nonsigner clauses.1"
A crippling blow was dealt the price maintenance structure
when, on May 21, 1951, the Supreme Court handed down its deci.
sion in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corporation."
A New Orleans retailer had been selling Seagram and Calvert
whiskey, obtained from a wholesaler, for less than the minimum
prices set in contracts between the distributors, Seagram and Cal-
vert, and more than one hundred Louisiana retailers. Schwegmann
Brothers refused to sign such a contract, but, having knowledge
of the other contracts, was bound under Louisiana law'" not to sell
at less than the minimum prices established by the contracts. Sea-
gram and Calvert brought suit to enjoin Schwegmann Brothers
8 The Florida Fair Trade Act was declared unconstitutional in 1950 because eco-
nomic conditions did not justify such a use of the police power. Seagram Distillers
Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (9th ed.) § 62,668 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1950).
1 Legislation, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 336, 344 (1937) ; Note, 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 115
(1938).
l Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., Ltd., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E. D. La. 1944): Eric
Calamia v. Goldsmith Bros., Inc., 299 N. Y. 636, 87 N. E. 2d 50 (1949) 299 N. Y. 795,
87 N. E. 2d 687 (1949)
11341 U. S. 384 (1951).
12 LA. G"r . STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 9809.1 et seq.
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from selling at a cut price. With three judges dissenting, the Su-
prcrne Court interpreted the Miller-Tydings Amendment to sanc-
tion only voluntary contracts or agreements and not nonsigner provi-
sions in a state statute with respect to goods moving in interstate
commerce.
The effect of the decision was immediate and drastic.
"The cool, august U. S. Supreme Court was responsible for
New York's steamy May madness."' 3 May 29, 1951, Macy's ran
two-page ads in the Times and Herald Tribune announcing a 6%
cut on 5,978 items of fair-trade goods. Gimbel's and other com-
peting department stores met Macy's prices and tried to better
them." Shoppers were in their glory; customers, trying to push
through the "In" and "Out" sides of a Macy's revolving door at
the same time, knocked down the door."5 Papers ran tables of typi-
cal price changes showing fair trade prices and opening and
closing prices on certain appliances, radio and television equip-
ment, clothing, stationery, and books. 6 Below is a table showing
the change in prices on certain items at Gimbel's." Macy's sold
400 Mixmasters in 45 minutes as compared with a previous aver-
age of 10 daily. Gimbel's sold 5,100 Palm Beach suits in three
days; the normal sales were 150 a day.'" To a lesser extent price
13 Life, June 11, 1951, p. 26.
14 159 Publishers' Weekly 2289 (June 2,1951).
15 Time, June 11, 1951, p. 97.
1 159 Publishers' Weekly 2493, 2994 (June 9, 1951).
17 Life, June 11, 1951, p. 26:
Fair
Trade
Price Tuesday Thursday Fri. Sat.
Toastmaster ............. $23,00 21.59 19.34 17.09 15.09 15.09 14.72
Mixmaster .............. 46.50 43.50 40.81 36.13 33.96 33.96 29.69 29.64 26.59t 26.59
Vacuum Cleaner ......... 89.95 84.50 79.43 75.14 75.14 66.39 58.63 52.97t
Pali Beach Suit ......... 29.!15 28.14 26.44 24.84 23.34 23.34 21.94 19.38 17.94 17.94 16.94
Springweave Suit ...... 49.50 46.59 43.71 41.11 38.84 38.64 34.14 30.17 29.69 29,69t
Besteelkr* .............. 4.50 4.23 3.98 3.94 .94 3.13 2.49 2.44 2.44 1.94
* From Here to Eternity




battles followed in Chicago, New Jersey, Albuquerque, Denver,
New Orleans, Oklahoma City, and elsewhere. 9
Gilbert E. Goodkind, executive secretary of the American Book-
sellers Association, characterized the Supreme Court decision as
a "hydrogen bomb." 2 He stated the net profit in department store
book departments averaged only 3/4%; therefore, the only desire
of the price-cutter was to ensnare the customer and expose him
to over-priced non-fair-traded items. He prophesied the disappear.
ance of the small retailer and the closing of book departments in
department stores which did not cut prices.
The price-slashing did not go unchallenged. Bantam Books can-
celed all orders from New York City department stores participat-
ing in price-cutting on paper-bound books. June 15 it refused a
rush order from Macy's for 2,500 books. Prices on 25-cent books
had fallen as low as 110. Mr. Ian Ballantine, president of Bantam
Books, said:
The low price of Bantam Books is made possible by mass distribu-
tion, a system which relies on 77,000 dealers, most of them small ones
with an average sale of five or six books a day.
These dealers depend on a fair-traded retail price and a reasonable
margin of profit. Any price-cutting move threatens the heart of our
distribution system.
Therefore, Bantam Books is discontinuing all sales efforts to and
is refusing all orders from dealers participating in price-cutting.21
Bayer Aspirin also discontinued the sale of products to stores
participating in price-cutting; the 59-cent 100-tablet bottle had
dropped to 4¢. Sterling Drug, Incorporated, of which Bayer Com-
pany is a division, ran advertisements in the New York City
papers in which Mr. James Hill, Jr., chairman and president,
stated that he considered the exploitation of Bayer Aspirin's good
name as "jungle tactics." He stated the stores were not philan-
thropists but hoped to induce the customers to believe the other
1 Newsweek. Jim, 18, 1951, p. 68; U. S. News & World l(eporl. Ji e It, 1951, p. 13.
20 159 Pnblishers' Weekly 2290 (June 2, 1951) ; id., p. 2464 (hiw' 16, 1951).
21 Id., p. 2537 (June 23. 1951).
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goods were also bargains and thus recoup their loss on Bayer
Aspirin. June 16 Gimbel's and Bloomingdale's ran out, but cus-
tomers were lined up back to the book department in Macy's,
where clerks were offering them novels to read while they waited."2
Eversharp, Goodall Fabrics, and Salton Manufacturing Com-
pany refused to make any more shipments to Macy's until the
store adhered to their price lists.2" Under the decision of the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Colgate24 there is no doubt that
manufacturers have the right to refuse to sell to price-cutters.
Sheaffer Pen Company sent its distributors a letter appealing to
them to keep the price up, and closed with the statement that no
more shipments would be made to any dealer who refused to abide
by their pricing policies.25 McKesson and Robbins Laboratories
proposed to show on all their customers' invoices the following:
FAIR TRADE AGREEMENT. Purchaser, by accepting delivery from
seller of any fair traded commodity, agrees not to re-sell such com-
modity, by direct or indirect means, at less than the prescribed net
retail minimum price published by the Producer or Distributor whose
trademark, brand or name appears on the commodity. This agreement
not applicable to sales in non-fair trade states or District of Columbia.26
Sunbeam Corporation filed suit against Macy's for $6,000,000
(triple damages) under the Sherman Antitrust Act for damage to
the trademark of "Mixmaster." The Mixmasters Macy's sold were
manufactured in New York. Macy's sold the Mixmaster for
$26.48; the list price was $46.50; the wholesale price was $29.70.
Sunbeam charged that Macy's had 3.3%' of the market in New
York City before the price war and 56.2%o during the price war.
Sunbeam had 97,000 out of 110,000 dealers under contract.27
If lower prices to consumers is a bad thing, the effect of the
22 Ibid.
23 Newsweek, June 11, 1951, pp. 75, 76.
24250 U. S. 300 (1919).
25 159 Publishers' Weekly 2462 (June 16, 1951).
26 Id., pp. 2462, 2463.
27 Business Week, Nov. 10, 1951, pp. 137, 138.
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Schwegmann case was obviously undesirable. But the fact that
prices were so drastically cut bears out the basic assumption of
the Supreme Court that vertical price-fixing does restrain compe.
tition at the retail level.
A question not answered by the Schwegmann decision is whether
a nonsigning retailer in the home state of the manufacturer is
bound if the manufacturer does interstate business. Cases decided
in the state courts since the Schwegmann case are not in accord.2"
Even if the nonsigner provision as to goods in intrastate com-
merce is valid, its effect will be weakened by the ability of the
retailers to bring in comparable goods from outside the state and
sell them at any price they choose.
It has been suggested that if a pre-Schwegmann fair trader
lowers his price to meet an undercutting nonsigner and is sued by
the manufacturer, the retailer may have a defense of mutual mis-
take as to the validity of the nonsigner provisions." A recent New
York decision, however, has held the signer would not be released
merely because he was being undersold by nonsigners3
The expected reaction to the Schwegmann decision has been a
renewed effort to obtain relief from Congress. There is at present
a bill before Congress to incorporate the nonsigner provision into
the Sherman Antitrust Act."
The Schwegmann decision, and its aftermath, raise again the
question as to the relationship of fair trade legislation to the
American concept of free competitive business enterprise. Texas
and other non-fair trade states have attained high levels of business
activity and prosperity without statutory protection of vertical
2s Bulova Watch Co. v. S. Klein on the Square, Inc., 105 N. Y. S. 2d 175 (Sup. Ct.
1951). temp. inj. ref.; Rothhaum v. R. If. Macy & Co., 105 N. Y. S. 2d 638 (Sup. Ct.
1951). temp. ini. granted.
" Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 121 (1951). This would le a mutual mistake as to
the law. Some states allow such a defense; others do not. 5 Wi.LIsrorN, CONntACIS (Rev.
ed. 1937) § 1582.
3o Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp. v. Standard Appliances, Inc., CCII Trade
Reg. Rep. (9th ed.) § 62,870 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
.11. R. 4662, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The bill has liv'u referred to the House
Judiciary Committee.
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price-fixing. It is doubtful whether in truth consumer opinion of
trade-marked goods is lessened merely because they are available
at a bargain. Fundamental principles of justice and fair play
strengthen the view that one contract between a manufacturer and
a retailer should not be permitted to govern every other retailer
in the state if the goods have moved in interstate commerce. In-
stead of amending the Miller-Tydings Act to make it applicable
to nonsigners, in the long run the preferred solution would be the
repeal of state Fair Trade Acts.
John G. Street, Jr.
